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In mid-October, I had the privilege of participating in the (OSCE)’s Election Observation Mission in Moldova. I was one of only a handful of representatives from the United States among slightly more than 300 total observers from 39 countries. I have served on several election observation missions in other countries before, but this past mission in Moldova was perhaps the one that had the greatest historic significance.

Bordered by Romania and Ukraine, Moldova, a small country of just under three million, has been torn between pro-Western and pro-Russian influences since the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. Moldova’s post-Soviet transition has been characterized by an ongoing conflict with its breakaway region of Transdniester, a predominantly Russian-speaking region along the left bank of the Dniester River bordering Ukraine, which declared independence in 1990 while Moldova was still part of the Soviet Union. Moldovan national forces and Russia-backed Transdniester engaged in a brief war in 1992, after which Transdniester retained its independence with Russia’s help. The conflict between Moldova and Transdniester has remained frozen for three decades. The so-called Republic of Transdniester is not recognized internationally; it receives all of its economic, political, and military backing from Russia, which has about 1,500 troops stationed there.

On October 20, Moldova held a presidential election along with a referendum on whether the country should amend its constitution to make Moldova’s aspiration to join the European Union its official geopolitical direction. Moldova’s pro-EU president Maia Sandu had campaigned for the referendum to be included in the election in order to make it harder for future governments to shift the country away from its pro-European trajectory if pro-Russian leaders were to come to power. In the presidential election, neither the incumbent president Sandu nor the runner-up, a pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, cleared the required 50 percent of the vote to win the election, so, as a result, the two faced off in a second round on 3 November.

One of the aspects that made the election unprecedented was the scale of Russia’s interference to manufacture an election outcome disfavoring pro-EU forces. Russia’s meddling in the election, including vote-buying, to derail Moldova’s pro-EU orientation was so blatant that even the OSCE, of which Russia is a member, stated in its that foreign interference – including destabilizing activities, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks – predominantly came from the Russian Federation and pro-Russian political forces.

Despite Moscow’s shameless impoverished Moldovans to vote against their country’s pro-EU orientation, the Kremlin’s plan to subvert Moldova’s electoral process failed. The “Yes” vote in favor of enshrining pro-EU orientation in the country’s constitution narrowly secured victory with 50.35 percent of the vote. The day after the election, we were informed that supporters of the pro-Russian socialist party were trying to organize protests to dispute referendum results, but those attempts gained no traction.

In the second round, the incumbent Maia Sandu was reelected with 54 percent of the vote, defeating her pro-Russian opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo. The first female president in Moldova, Maia Sandu is also the first Moldovan president to win a reelection. Despite Russia’s relentless meddling in the election, the Moldovan people chose to continue to pursue a European and democratic path, and high election turnout was further confirmation of that commitment.

Another factor that seemed to play a significant role in swaying Moldovan public opinion in favor of the EU and against Russia was the Kremlin’s brutal aggression against neighboring Ukraine. That said, Moldovans remain rather divided in their geopolitical preferences. On the one hand, Russia’s war against Ukraine consolidated Moldova’s pro-EU position. On the other, many fear that Moldova's closer integration with the EU may antagonize Russia and trigger Russia’s military aggression. The ongoing war in the neighboring Ukraine is a daily reminder of Putin’s recklessness, disregard for human life, commitment to neo-imperial ambitions, strong anti-western sentiment, and high appetite for risk.

It is widely agreed that had Russian troops not been pushed back by the Ukrainian forces in the opening phases of the full-scale war, Russia would have attempted to occupy the entirety of southern Ukraine to create a land bridge with Transdniester. Occupation of the entire southern Ukraine remains Putin’s long-term objective. Such a move would deny Ukraine seaport access and assert Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea. It would also place Russian troops on the doorstep of two NATO countries – Poland and Romania. It is questionable whether Russia has the capabilities to execute such an ambitious plan given its struggles in Ukraine. But despite heavy economic and military losses, Putin appears to be committed to his neo-imperial foreign policy, as evidenced by Russia’s escalating offensive in Ukraine.

Moldova-EU relationship

Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe. My assigned area of observation was the Cahul region in the west of the country, on the border with Romania. Most villages we visited were quite poor and sparsely populated. Many villages had groundwater wells as their only source of water. The economy and the population are heavily dependent on , which are the main source of income for many families. Many locals with whom we interacted had family members working overseas and sending remittances home. It is that at least half of Moldovans maintain dual citizenship with Romania or other countries, allowing them to work overseas. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put an on Moldova’s economy, as more than 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens have crossed into Moldova fleeing the war, with approximately 120,000 still residing there. Despite facing substantial political and economic difficulties, Moldovans rose to the occasion in support of Ukrainians, both by hosting refugees, as well as imposing sanctions on Russia.

Moldova has been receiving substantial EU assistance to improve its infrastructure and living standards. When traveling through Moldova, one thing that immediately struck me was how many public sites in Moldova, including government buildings, schools, and libraries, had public-facing plaques stating that the site had been rebuilt with EU funding. Even Moldova’s largest winery, Vinăria din Vale, which we had the privilege of touring, had received EU funds. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine elevated the urgency of improving Moldova’s transportation infrastructure due to the need to transport Ukraine’s grain into Europe by land after Russia blockaded Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

In June 2022, along with Ukraine, Moldova also became a European Union candidate country, signaling its commitment to anti-corruption reforms, democracy, and rule of law. Moldova’s bonds with the EU have also strengthened via trade, as more than 60 percent of Moldovan exports go to the EU – making it by far Moldova’s most important .

Russia’s hybrid war and language politics

Despite its small size, Moldova is quite diverse – in part evidenced by the fact that during the election, all materials were available in six languages – Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Romani, Bulgarian, and Gagauz. The official language of Moldova is Romanian, which many in Moldova still call the Moldovan language. Interestingly, the first disagreement we observed between our translator, a linguist in her 20s, and our driver, a business owner in his 50s, was precisely about whether Moldovan or Romanian was Moldova’s official language. Moldovan and Romanian languages are basically the same language. The Soviet Union annexed the territory of modern-day Moldova from Romania in the 1940s, establishing it as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Soviet leadership popularized the term “Moldovan” language to enforce Moldova’s distinction from Romania. However, in 2023, the Moldovan parliament officially “Moldovan” with “Romanian” as the country’s only official language.

Russian is still widely spoken in Moldova as well. I frequently relied on my Russian-speaking skills to communicate with people and navigate Moldova. However, I noticed that younger people preferred English to Russian, even if their English proficiency was weaker. Russia’s promotion, and often forceful imposition, of the Russian language abroad, especially in Russia’s perceived “spheres of influence” has long been Moscow’s tool of choice for spreading Russian propaganda and co-opting populations into Russia’s way of thinking. However, as the most recent elections in Moldova showed, Moscow’s “soft power” had been losing its appeal even among Russia’s historical allies. But Moscow’s weakened influence on Moldova also raises fears that as Moscow’s soft power erodes, it is more likely to resort to hard power—exemplified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine —to maintain its control in the post-Soviet space. Given these realities, Moldova’s security is in no small part dependent on Ukraine’s ability to hold back the Russian advance.

Overall, it was incredible to be in Moldova to witness one of its most historic elections, as the country is trying to make strides toward Europe and away from Russia. In the immediate future, however, Moldova’s fate is most closely intertwined with that of Ukraine. If Ukraine can hold the Russian troops back, Moldova will likely be safe from the Kremlin’s aggression. A weakened Russia might also give the Russia-backed regime in Transdniester an incentive to cooperate with the legitimate government in Chișinău, the capital of Moldova. I hope that the West will continue supporting both Ukraine and Moldova in their fight against Russia – such support is well within our means and is essential to transatlantic security.